📕 Key Terminology
Drand Node: A node running the drand daemon, participating in generating randomness across one or multiple networks. A drand network consists of interconnected drand nodes, each with a long-term public key and a private share.
Relay Node: A node connected to a drand daemon, providing an Internet-facing interface to fetch public randomness. The relay network consists of relay nodes that may be partially connected.
Corrupted Node: A node controlled by an attacker, giving access to all its cryptographic material and network authorizations.
Offline Node: A node that is unreachable from an external point of view.
Online Node: A node that is running and correctly transmitting packets over the Internet.
🌒 Security Phases
In drand, there are two main phases, each with specific security assumptions:
Phase 1. Distributed Key Generation (DKG) Setup
The DKG protocol follows Pedersen's protocol, ensuring:
- Synchronous Network: Packets reach their destination within a bounded time.
- Synchronized Clocks: Nodes have synchronized clocks with minimal offset.
- Reliable Broadcast Channel: All nodes receive the same packet within a bounded time.
- Authenticated Channel: All communications are authenticated.
- Public Group: Nodes know each other's public keys before starting the DKG.
Phase 2. Randomness Generation
The randomness generation phase ensures:
- Network Flexibility: No strict network bounds; nodes process packets as they arrive.
- Synchronized Clocks: Nodes start rounds simultaneously with accurate clock synchronization.
- Broadcast Channel: A regular broadcast channel suffices for partial beacon transmission.
- Threshold: A specific number of nodes must be online and honest to create the final random beacon.
- Determinism: The chain is deterministic with respect to a fresh DKG phase.
💥 Attack Vectors & Mitigations
Randomness Generation Attacks
- Front Running:
- Passive Adversary: An attacker listening to traffic might aggregate the final beacon before others.
- Active Adversary: An attacker tries to disable half of the nodes, deciding whether to release the final beacon.
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks:
- Scenario: Sustained DoS attacks can halt the chain if enough nodes are disabled.
- Defense: Block incoming traffic early, allowing only known IP addresses.
- Corruption:
- Scenario #1: Attacker corrupts less than the threshold of nodes, gaining no meaningful information.
- Scenario #2: Attacker corrupts more than the threshold, deriving the entire chain.
Distributed Key Generation Attacks
- DoS During DKG:
- Nodes may miss shares or replies, risking exclusion.
- Remediation: Manual verification of the final group and decision to re-run DKG if necessary.
- Corruption During DKG:
- Scenario 1: Attacker influences the distribution of private shares without biasing randomness.
- Scenario 2: Attacker controls more than the threshold, knowing the randomness chain.
- Broadcast Channel Assumption:
- Attacker sends inconsistent shares, causing verification issues.
- Observation: Nodes publish the distributed public key and start randomness rounds, enabling third-party verification.
Conclusion
drand employs robust security measures, including pairing-based cryptography and threshold BLS signatures, to ensure publicly verifiable, unbiased, and unpredictable randomness. Regular resharing and strict network protocols further enhance security and resilience against attacks.
